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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
 
. 
Mark Hagans appeals the cessation of his Social 
Security disability insurance benefits following a 
determination by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) 
that he was no longer disabled.  Hagans argues the District 
Court erred by reviewing his disability status as of September 
1, 2004 — the day on which, according to the SSA, Hagans’s 
disability ceased.  This contention requires us to decide what 
level of deference, if any, we should afford the SSA’s 
Acquiescence Ruling interpreting the cessation provision of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(f), as referring to the 
time of the SSA’s initial disability determination.  Hagans 
further argues that substantial evidence does not support the 
SSA’s conclusion that he was not fully disabled as of 
September 1, 2004.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Until January 2003, Mark Hagans worked as a security 
guard for a federal agency and as a sanitation worker for the 
city of Newark.  That month, however, when he was 44 years 
old, Hagans began suffering from chest pains.  He required 
immediate open-heart surgery to repair a dissecting aortic 
aneurysm, a potentially life-threatening condition that occurs 
when a tear in the aorta’s inner layer allows blood to enter the 
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middle layer.  Hagans was hospitalized for the surgery and 
recovery during intermittent periods between January 29, 
2003, and February 28, 2003.  He then spent approximately 
three months in a rehabilitation center, where he underwent 
physical and speech therapy.  He left this facility sometime in 
April or May of 2003.   
 
In addition to his heart ailment, Hagans claims he has 
underlying medical problems relating to his cerebrovascular 
and respiratory systems, as well as hypertension and 
dysphagia (difficulty in swallowing).  Hagans also complains 
of other issues, such as insomnia and back pain, which he 
alleges affect his ability to stand, sit, and lift.  He has also 
been diagnosed with depression.   
 
Hagans’s initial application for disability benefits was 
granted and he began receiving benefits as of January 30, 
2003.  On September 21, 2004, however, pursuant to an 
updated Residual Function Capacity (“RFC”) assessment 
showing Hagans’s condition had improved, the SSA 
determined that Hagans was no longer eligible for benefits 
because his disability had terminated on September 1, 2004.  
Hagans’s appeal to a Disability Hearing Officer was denied.  
Hagans continued to pursue an appeal and received a hearing 
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in September 
2008, at which he was unrepresented by counsel.2
The record reflects that Hagans received a great deal of 
medical care between his surgery in January 2003 and the 
termination of his benefits in September 2004.  The ALJ 
considered several evaluations of Hagans’s condition, most of 
which were completed in mid-2004.  For instance, the ALJ 
reviewed an August 31, 2004, report from Dr. Ramesh Patel, 
Hagans’s treating physician.  Dr. Patel diagnosed Hagans 
with obesity, post-surgery illness, hypertension, hearing 
problems, possible arthritis of the neck, and shortness of 
breath.  This report showed that an EKG of Hagans’s heart 
was normal and a chest X-ray indicated clear lungs and no 
 
                                              
2  Hagans’s hearing had originally been scheduled for May 
14, 2008, but it was adjourned so that Hagans could obtain 
counsel.  He again appeared unrepresented on the rescheduled 
date, and the hearing proceeded without counsel. 
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sign of heart failure.  Dr. Patel indicated Hagans’s range of 
motion was limited, but did not opine on his ability to 
perform work-related activities.3
 
  The ALJ also considered 
the evaluation of Dr. Burton Gillette, the SSA’s staff 
physician, which was performed on September 15, 2004.  Dr. 
Gillette’s evaluation included an RFC assessment which 
indicated that Hagans could not stand or walk for more than 
four hours per day, but could sit for about six hours during an 
eight-hour day and had improved lifting abilities.  Further, the 
ALJ considered the evaluation of Ernest Uzondu, a disability 
adjudicator, conducted on the same day as Dr. Gillette’s RFC 
assessment.  Uzondu determined that Hagans could not 
perform his past relevant work, but that he was able to 
perform other work.  Finally, the ALJ considered an internal 
medicine evaluation from Dr. David Tiersten conducted on 
March 16, 2006.  In this 2006 evaluation, Dr. Tiersten 
diagnosed Hagans with obesity, post-surgery illness, chest 
pain, back pain, leg pain, and hypertension, but found that 
Hagans did not have significant limitations to prevent him 
from working. 
Although Hagans claims he is limited to standing for 
4-5 minutes, sitting for 30 minutes, walking only at a slow 
pace, and lifting no more than ten pounds, the record reflects 
disagreement among the doctors about Hagans’s abilities.  A 
vocational expert testified that there were jobs available that 
someone with Hagans’s infirmities could perform, such as 
ticket seller, assembler of small products, and garment sorter.  
At the time of the ALJ hearing, Hagans represented that he 
spent his time watching television, helping at church, 
napping, and visiting a nearby park.  He claims he requires 
assistance shaving and showering.  As of September 1, 2004, 
he had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity 
following his heart surgery.  
 
                                              
3  Approximately two years later, Dr. Patel examined Hagans 
and concluded he was “totally and permanently disabled.”  
Soc. Sec. R. 230–31.  Dr. Patel reiterated that Hagans 
suffered from the same ailments but did not explain why his 
assessment had become so dire during the two intervening 
years. 
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On February 26, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision 
finding that Hagans’s disability had ceased on September 1, 
2004.  Specifically, the ALJ found that Hagans’s condition 
had improved and he was capable of engaging in substantial 
gainful activity, although he could not perform his past 
relevant work.  On May 21, 2009, the Appeals Council denied 
review, which rendered the ALJ’s opinion the final decision 
of the SSA. 
 
Hagans then filed the instant action.  On April 8, 2011, 
the District Judge affirmed the SSA’s decision that Hagans’s 
eligibility for disability benefits ended on September 1, 2004.  
Hagans has continued to receive benefits pending the 
outcome of this appeal.  Hagans also filed a new application 
for disability insurance benefits on January 20, 2010.4
 
   
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the final 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
We exercise plenary review over all legal issues.  
Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 
431 (3d Cir. 1999).  We review an ALJ’s decision under the 
same standard of review as the District Court, to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support 
the ALJ’s decision.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Plummer v. 
Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  Substantial 
evidence has been defined as “more than a mere scintilla”; it 
means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate.”  Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427 (quotations 
marks omitted).  “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those 
findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry 
differently.”   Fargnoli v. Massanari
 
, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
III. 
                                              
4  This application was originally dismissed based upon a 
finding of res judicata, but its current status is unclear. 
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We begin with the issue to which we will devote the 
bulk of this opinion:  Hagans’s assertion that the District 
Court erred by finding that the relevant date for determining 
whether he continued to be disabled was the date on which 
the SSA asserts that his disability had ceased — September 1, 
2004 — rather than the date of the ALJ’s hearing or the date 
of the ALJ’s ruling (September 22, 2008 or February 26, 
2009, respectively).  Use of one of these later dates would 
bolster Hagans’s claim for disability benefits because he had 
advanced into a different age category by the time of the 
ALJ’s hearing.5  The SSA contends that review of Hagans’s 
disability should be confined to the date on which the SSA 
first found that Hagans was no longer disabled — that is, 
September 1, 2004.6
The provision we must interpret to resolve this dispute 
is 42 U.S.C. § 423(f), which is entitled “Standard of review 
for termination of disability benefits.”  This section provides:  
 
 
A recipient of benefits . . . may be determined 
not to be entitled to such benefits on the basis of 
a finding that the physical or mental impairment 
                                              
5 Specifically, in September 2004 Hagans was in his mid-40s, 
which is considered a “younger individual” according to the 
Social Security regulations.  20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 
App. 2.  At the time of the ALJ hearing, however, he was 50 
years old, which placed him in the “closely approaching 
advanced age” category.  Id.   
 
6 We note that the SSA did not issue its decision finding that 
Hagans was disabled as of September 1, 2004 until three 
weeks later, on September 21, 2004.  It would be a rare case 
in which this three-week period had some impact on the 
analysis of whether a benefits recipient remained disabled, 
and, in this case, it has none.  We will thus use the date on 
which Hagans’s disability purportedly ceased — September 
1, 2004 — for the purposes of our analysis.  We need not 
resolve what should happen when there is an analytically 
relevant distinction between the date of the SSA’s decision 
and the date of cessation.  To the extent that we refer to “the 
date on which the SSA found that Hagans’s disability had 
ceased,” we intend that phrase to mean September 1, 2004. 
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on the basis of which such benefits are provided 
has ceased, does not exist, or is not disabling 
only if such finding is supported by-- 
 
(1) substantial evidence which demonstrates 
that-- 
 
(A) there has been any medical improvement in 
the individual’s impairment or combination of 
impairments (other than medical improvement 
which is not related to the individual's ability to 
work), and 
 
(B) the individual is now able to engage in 
substantial gainful activity . . . 
 
Any determination under this section shall be 
made on the basis of all the evidence available 
in the individual’s case file, including new 
evidence concerning the individual’s prior or 
current condition
 
 which is presented by the 
individual or secured by the Commissioner of 
Social Security.  
Id.
 
 (emphasis added). 
In support of its position, the SSA asserts that we 
should follow the Acquiescence Ruling it issued in 1992, 
which interpreted § 423(f) as requiring the evaluation of a 
benefits recipient’s disability status as of the time that the 
SSA first determined that cessation of benefits was proper.  
Specifically, the ruling stated:   
 
SSA interprets the term “current,” as used in the 
statutory and regulatory language concerning 
termination of disability benefits, to relate to the 
time of the cessation under consideration in the 
initial determination of cessation.  In making an 
initial determination that a claimant’s disability 
has ceased, SSA considers the claimant’s 
condition at the time SSA is making the initial 
determination.  In deciding the appeal of that 
cessation determination, the Secretary considers 
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what the claimant’s condition was at the time of 
the cessation determination, not the claimant’s 
condition at the time of the disability 
hearing/reconsideration determination, ALJ 
decision or Appeals Council decision.  
However, if the evidence indicates that the 
claimant’s condition may have again become 
disabling subsequent to the cessation of his or 
her disability or that he or she has a new 
impairment, the adjudicator solicits a new 
application. 
 
Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 92-2(6), 57 Fed. Reg. 
9262 (Mar. 17, 1992) (hereinafter “AR 92-2(6)”).  We must 
decide how, if at all, this ruling should affect our analysis.7
 
 
A. 
 
We begin with the Supreme Court’s watershed 
decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which 
dramatically increased the level of deference courts must 
generally give to administrative agencies’ interpretations of 
statutes.  Chevron requires courts to conduct a two-step 
inquiry.  Under the first step, “[w]hen a court reviews an 
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,” it 
must ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”  Id. at 842.  If Congress has 
resolved the question, the clear intent of Congress binds both 
the agency and the court.  Id.; see also Reese Bros., Inc. v. 
United States, 447 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Under 
Chevron
                                              
7 Neither party addressed this issue in its brief.  We therefore 
requested supplemental letter briefs from both parties 
following oral argument.  We were particularly interested in 
learning whether the SSA had employed the policy outlined 
in AR 92-2(6) prior to the issuance of that ruling.  The SSA’s 
letter brief cited no evidence indicating the existence of the 
policy prior to 1992.  Accordingly, we must assume the 
policy was formulated contemporaneously with the issuance 
of the AR. 
, [if] the congressional intent is clear . . . , the inquiry 
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ends; the court and agency ‘must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44)).  Under the second step, if 
“Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue,” because “the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  The 
agency’s interpretation will prevail so long as “it is a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute — not necessarily the 
only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation 
deemed most reasonable by the courts.”  Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc.
 
, 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009).   
This presumption of strong deference serves several 
goals.  As the Court explained in Chevron, affording agencies 
significant discretion to interpret the law they administer 
recognizes the value of agency expertise and the 
comparatively limited experience of the judiciary where an 
interpretation requires specialized knowledge.  467 U.S. at 
865.  Moreover, the Chevron doctrine promotes national 
uniformity in regulatory policy, thereby enabling agencies to 
avoid the difficulty of enforcing different rules depending on 
the jurisdiction — a benefit that the SSA has cited as the 
primary reason for its issuance of Acquiescence Rulings.  See 
Social Security Disability Insurance Program:  Hearing 
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance
 
, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
115 (Jan. 25, 1984) (statement of SSA Commissioner Martha 
A. McSteen) (testifying that the SSA’s “policy of 
nonacquiescence is essential to insure that the agency follows 
its statutory mandate to administer [the Social Security] 
program in a uniform and consistent manner”).   
Where Chevron deference is inappropriate, a court 
may instead apply a lesser degree of deference pursuant to 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  More will be 
said about the nature of a Skidmore analysis, but for now it 
suffices to note that Skidmore requires a court to assign a 
weight to an administrative judgment based on “the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
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pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”  323 U.S. at 140.8
B. 
   
 
Regardless of whether we apply Chevron or Skidmore
                                              
8 There is one other deference doctrine worthy of a brief 
mention.  In Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997), the 
Supreme Court considered the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation of a regulation (not a statutory provision) 
promulgated pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act.  
Despite the fact that the Secretary’s interpretation came “in 
the form of a legal brief,” the Court held it was nonetheless 
entitled to strong deference because it was not a “post hoc 
rationalization” and it represented the agency’s “fair and 
considered judgment.”  Id.  The Court explained that 
deference was warranted because “requiring the Secretary to 
construe his own regulations narrowly would make little 
sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he 
wishes, subject only to the limits imposed by the statute.”  Id. 
at 463. 
 
deference, our initial inquiry requires us to determine whether 
§ 423(f) is ambiguous.  We conduct this ambiguity analysis as 
 
The liberal standard for deference under Auer might 
arguably apply to the parallel regulation to § 423(f), 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1594 (which replaces the statutory phrase “now 
able to engage in substantial activity” with “currently able to 
engage in substantial activity”), were it not for the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).  
There, the Court declined to give strong deference to an 
interpretive memorandum by the Attorney General because 
the regulation reviewed in the memorandum used the same 
terminology as the original statute from which it was derived.  
The Court explained that this type of “parroting regulation” 
does not receive deference under Auer because “[a]n agency 
does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words 
when, instead of using its expertise and experience to 
formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the 
statutory language.”  Id. at 256–58.  Given the similarity 
between the disputed terms occurring in the statute and the 
regulation, AR 92-2(6) cannot receive deference under Auer.   
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a matter of statutory interpretation which is necessarily 
antecedent to our deference inquiry because we need reach 
the deference question only if we find the statutory language 
is ambiguous.  See Del. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. 
Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 284 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (hereinafter “DDNR”) (suggesting a deference 
analysis need only be “resort[ed] to” when the statutory text 
is ambiguous).  If we decide that the statute is unambiguous, 
we are bound to give effect to the words of Congress.  
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.9
 
   
Our goal when interpreting a statute is to effectuate 
Congress’s intent.  Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 
141 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Because we presume that Congress’ 
intent is most clearly expressed in the text of the statute, we 
begin our analysis with an examination of the plain language 
of the relevant provision.”  Reese Bros., 447 F.3d at 235.  In 
trying to divine the intent of Congress, we should consider the 
entire scope of the relevant statute.  See United States v. 
Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme 
Court has stated consistently that the text of a statute must be 
considered in the larger context or structure of the statute in 
which it is found.”).  When a statute is “complex and contains 
many interrelated provisions,” it may be “impossible to attach 
a plain meaning to provisions in isolation.”  Cleary ex rel. 
Cleary v. Waldman
 
, 167 F.3d 801, 807 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the Medicare statute meets this criteria and is 
therefore ambiguous). 
Two other courts have found that the terms “current” 
and “now” contained in § 423(f) are unambiguous.  The first 
case to address whether a disability benefits recipient’s 
eligibility must be evaluated from the date of cessation or the 
time of the ALJ’s hearing was Difford v. Secretary of Health 
& Human Services
                                              
9 The fact that we are conducting an ambiguity analysis that is 
indistinguishable from the first step of Chevron should not be 
misconstrued as a decision to apply Chevron deference.  As 
we have made clear above, we do not reach the deference 
question unless the statute is ambiguous. 
, 910 F.2d 1316 (6th Cir. 1990).  There, 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the ALJ 
should adjudicate the claimant’s disabilities at the time of his 
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or her hearing, such that if the claimant were found to be 
disabled at the time of the hearing — even if he was not 
disabled as of the cessation date — his benefits should not be 
terminated.  The court placed special emphasis on the fact 
that § 423(f) requires an ALJ to review the recipient’s 
“current” status as of “now,” which it found to be a clear, 
unambiguous indication that Congress had intended the ALJ’s 
review to focus on the benefits recipient at the time of the 
ALJ’s hearing.  Id. at 1320.10
 
   
The second case to find the terms “now” and “current” 
unambiguous was Aikens v. Shalala
 
, 956 F. Supp. 14, 20 
(D.D.C. 1997).  The district court adopted the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s view and thus required an 
evaluation of the recipient contemporaneous with the ALJ’s 
hearing.  The court explained:  
The plain meaning of the statute, the legislative 
history and the SSA’s own regulations compel 
[the Sixth Circuit’s construction of the words 
“now” and “current”].  Although the Secretary 
faults the Sixth Circuit for focusing on the plain 
meaning of the words “now” and “current,” it is 
an “elementary principle of statutory 
construction that ordinarily the plain meaning of 
statutory language controls, i.e., ‘words should  
be given their common and approved usage.’”  
 
Id. at 20–21 (quoting United Scenic Artists v. NLRB
 
, 762 
F.2d 1027, 1032 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1985).   
Two years later, however, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit disagreed.  In Johnson v. Apfel
                                              
10 AR 92-2(6) was issued to clarify the SSA’s disagreement 
with Difford.  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had 
an opportunity to reconsider Difford after the issuance of AR 
92-2(6), but it elected not to do so in light of the factual 
differences between that case and Difford.  See Henley v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 58 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, 
Difford remains good law in the Sixth Circuit. 
, 191 F.3d 770 
(7th Cir. 1999), the court held that § 423(f) was ambiguous 
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when its terminology was viewed in the context of the entire 
Social Security Act.  The court adopted the SSA’s 
interpretation of § 423(f), which, in contrast to the 
interpretation reached in Difford and Aikens, asserted that 
“by using the terms ‘now’ and ‘current,’ Congress was 
merely distinguishing between the time when the agency 
originally made a determination that the claimant was 
disabled and the time the agency determined whether 
disability ceased.”  Id.
 
 at 775. 
We are in accord with the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in viewing the terms “now” and “current” as 
susceptible to more than one reasonable explanation when 
viewed in context.  In drafting a section about the cessation of 
benefits — benefits that were necessarily granted in some 
prior determination — it makes sense that the statutory 
drafters would have to distinguish between the unfavorable 
cessation decision and the earlier, favorable decision to grant 
benefits.  The ambiguity in § 423(f) stems from its reliance on 
the use of the passive voice.  The statute provides, “A 
recipient of benefits . . . may be determined not to be entitled 
to such benefits . . . .”  The language thus lacks the necessary 
identifying factor:  who
 
 is making the determination about 
entitlement to benefits?  It would be logical to presume that it 
is the ALJ who makes the determination, given the ALJ’s role 
in holding a hearing and reviewing the evidence, but to avoid 
ambiguity the statute would need to have been drafted more 
clearly. 
Our consideration of a related, more specific provision 
of § 423 does not resolve this ambiguity.  Section 
423(d)(5)(B), which applies to both an initial determination of 
disability and a determination about whether such disability is 
ongoing, provides, in relevant part: 
 
In making any determination with respect to 
whether an individual . . . continues to be under 
a disability, the Commissioner of Social 
Security shall consider all evidence available in 
such individual’s case record, and shall develop 
a complete medical history of at least the 
preceding twelve months for any case in which 
a determination is made that the individual is 
14 
 
not under a disability.  In making any 
determination the Commissioner of Social 
Security shall make every reasonable effort to 
obtain from the individual’s treating physician 
(or other treating health care provider) all 
medical evidence . . . necessary in order  
to properly make such determination . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B).  The term “Commissioner” is 
synonymous with the SSA and thus may be fairly understood 
to encompass all levels of review within the operation of the 
agency.  It is true that the SSA’s decision is not final until 
after the ALJ hearing and any subsequent appeal occur.  
Nonetheless, the Commissioner begins review of any 
cessation case with an initial cessation determination.  
Because the use of the term “Commissioner” in 
§ 423(d)(5)(B) — a provision which also applies to a 
cessation proceeding — refers to the agency broadly, rather 
than specifying the level of review within the agency, it does 
not unambiguously identify the ALJ as the person making a 
benefits eligibility determination during a cessation 
proceeding.   
 
For these reasons, we conclude that § 423(f) is 
ambiguous.    
 
C. 
 
Having determined that § 423(f) is ambiguous, we 
must now decide whether this is the type of case in which 
Chevron deference is proper, or whether Skidmore
 
 instead 
provides the appropriate framework for reviewing the SSA’s 
interpretation contained in AR 92-2(6).  The Supreme Court 
issued a trilogy of opinions between 2000 and 2002 which 
guide our analysis.   
The first case in the trilogy is Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000),  which involved an informal 
agency adjudication.11
                                              
11 We recognize that the adjudication at issue in Christensen 
is different than the Acquiescence Ruling in this matter 
because, unlike an agency ruling, an adjudication is without 
  There, the Court considered whether 
15 
 
Chevron deference should be given to an opinion letter 
written by the Acting Administrator of the Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division.  The Supreme Court first 
explained that “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion 
letters — like interpretations contained in policy statements, 
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which 
lack the force of law — do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”  Id. at 587.12
                                                                                                     
“general or particular applicability and future effect.”  5 
U.S.C. § 551; see also 33 Charles Alan Wright & Charles H. 
Koch, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8342 (1st ed. 2006) 
(explaining that a decision made through an informal 
advisory letter or opinion constitutes an adjudication, not a 
ruling, because these decisions “determine individual rights 
or duties”).  Nonetheless, the similarities regarding the lack of 
notice-and-comment procedures between these two agency 
actions render Christensen a useful guidepost. 
  The Court held that we must instead 
 
12  Even before the Supreme Court decided Christensen, we 
recognized that Chevron deference was not appropriate for all 
forms of agency interpretations.  In Cleary, 167 F.3d 801, we 
considered policy memoranda and letters issued by the Health 
Care Financing Administration and the Department of Health 
and Human Services.  We noted that determining the proper 
level of deference “becomes more complicated when the 
agency’s interpretation is contained in informal views or 
guidelines outside the course of notice and comment 
procedures.”  Id. at 807.  In such circumstances, “[w]e have 
questioned what degree of deference, if any, to afford an 
agency’s views.”  Id.  We then explained that Chevron had 
not overruled the Supreme Court’s longstanding rule of 
deference for informal agency interpretations as contained in 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  After applying Skidmore 
deference, we found the agency’s “policy conforms to the 
language of the statute, to its legislative history, and to the 
purpose for which it was enacted” and was therefore entitled 
to deference.  Cleary, 167 F.3d at 811–12.   
 
While Cleary remains good law, subsequent 
developments in the law have complicated our deference 
analysis.  In Cleary, we noted that informal agency 
interpretations “will receive some deference by the court if 
16 
 
give the agency’s interpretation “respect” pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Skidmore.  Id. (quoting 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).13  The Christensen majority held 
that, upon weighing the Skidmore
 
 factors, the Department of 
Labor’s opinion letter was insufficiently persuasive and was 
therefore unworthy of deference.  
In United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), 
the Court considered a tariff classification ruling by the 
United States Customs Service.  Id. at 224–25.  The Court 
explained that Chevron was premised on the idea that 
Congress had explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to an 
agency to administer a statute, thereby empowering the 
agency to interpret the statute so long as its interpretation is 
consistent with the statutory language.  Id. at 226–27 (noting 
Chevron deference applies “when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority”).  An express delegation occurred when Congress 
“‘explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill,’” rendering “any 
ensuing regulation . . . binding in the courts unless 
procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id. at 227 (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).  Deciding whether Congress 
implicitly delegated authority to the agency requires a court to 
consider “the agency’s generally conferred authority and 
other statutory circumstances that [indicate] Congress would 
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law 
when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in 
the enacted law.”  Id.
                                                                                                     
they are consistent with the plain language and purposes of 
the statute and if they are consistent with prior administrative 
views.”  Id. at 808.  However, as we will explain, we must 
now consider the additional (albeit similar) factors set forth in 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).  
 at 229.  The Court noted that “a very 
 
13  We applied this rule in Madison v. Resources for Human 
Development, Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2000), 
explaining that “[a]s to the persuasiveness of agency 
interpretive guidelines, we note our continued reliance on the 
framework laid out in Skidmore v. Swift.” 
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good indicator of delegation” would be “congressional 
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or 
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which 
deference is claimed.”  Id.  This is so because in general, 
when Congress provides “for a relatively formal 
administrative procedure . . . [that fosters] fairness and 
deliberation,” it makes sense to assume that “Congress 
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law.”  
Id. at 230.  Nonetheless, the level of formality did not fully 
resolve the question because precedent showed that Chevron 
deference might also be appropriate “even when no such 
administrative formality was required and none was 
afforded.”  Id. at 231.  Upon consideration of the lack of 
process and “any other circumstances reasonably suggesting 
that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as 
deserving [Chevron] deference,” the Court declined to give 
the tariff classification ruling Chevron deference.  Id.  The 
Court remanded for a determination of whether Skidmore
 
 
deference was appropriate instead.   
A year after Mead, the Supreme Court addressed 
deference to a decision made by the SSA in Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).  There, the Court considered a 
SSA regulation eventually adopted after notice-and-comment 
procedures, which related to a policy that the agency had 
initially adopted through less formal means — including a 
Social Security Ruling issued some 20 years prior.  Id.
 
 at 219.  
The Court disagreed with the recipient’s contention that this 
earlier ruling should not be worthy of deference and 
explained: 
[T]he fact that the Agency previously reached 
its interpretation through means less formal than 
“notice and comment” rulemaking, does not 
automatically deprive that interpretation of the 
judicial deference otherwise its due. . . . Mead 
pointed to instances in which the Court has 
applied Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations that did not emerge out of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  It indicated 
that whether a court should give such deference 
depends in significant part upon the interpretive 
method used and the nature of the question at 
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issue. 
 
Id.
 
 at 221–22.   
The Court did not employ the “force of law” 
distinction enunciated in Mead
 
, instead focusing its inquiry 
on Congress’s grant of authority, explicit or implied, as 
determined by analyzing whether the specific statutory 
scheme suggests that Congress has granted an agency the 
power to interpret its own statutory terms.  The Court further 
explained: 
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the 
related expertise of the Agency, the importance 
of the question to administration of the statute, 
the complexity of that administration, and the 
careful consideration the Agency has given the 
question over a long period of time all indicate 
that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens 
through which to view the  
legality of the Agency interpretation here at 
issue. 
 
Id. at 222.  Reiterating this point, the Court concluded, “The 
statute’s complexity, the vast number of claims that it 
engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and 
administrative experience lead us to read the statute as 
delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, 
through interpretation, matters of detail related to its 
administration.”  Id.
 
 at 225.     
A few guiding principles can be gleaned from the 
above cases in determining whether to apply Chevron 
deference or lower Skidmore deference.14
                                              
14 We have infrequently applied the rules set forth in 
Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart.  Perhaps the closest 
analogous case to the type of agency action we address here is 
Mercy Catholic Medical Center v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 
152 (3d Cir. 2004).  There, we declined to apply Chevron 
deference to an informal interpretive rule issued by the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services 
“as an official instruction to fiscal intermediaries” that was 
  Our overarching 
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concern is whether “Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and 
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”  Mead, 533 
U.S. at 226–27.  In addition, we will consider the factors set 
forth in Barnhart:  (1) the interstitial nature of the legal 
question; (2) the related expertise of the agency; (3) the 
importance of the question to administration of the statute; (4) 
the complexity of that administration; and (5) the careful 
consideration the agency has given the question over a long 
period of time.  534 U.S. at 222.15
                                                                                                     
later published in the Federal Register.  Id.  We noted that 
“agency interpretive guidelines ‘do not rise to the level of a 
regulation and do not have the effect of law.’”  Id. at 155 
(quoting Brooks v. Vill. of Ridgefield Park, 185 F.3d 130, 
135 (3d Cir. 1999)).  We also explained that Chevron 
deference is inappropriate for “informal agency 
interpretations” because allowing strong deference “‘would 
unduly validate the results of an informal process.’”  Id. 
(quoting Madison, 233 F.3d at 185).  After applying 
Skidmore, we held that the agency’s interpretation was not 
persuasive and declined to afford it any deference.  Id. at 
155–58. 
 
 
15 Many of these questions can be resolved by examining the 
language and structure of the statute that an agency is charged 
with administering.  Regarding the complexity of the 
regulatory program at issue, it should be noted that courts 
more readily grant Chevron deference when a case involves a 
“complex and highly technical regulatory program,” which 
“require[s] significant expertise and entail[s] the exercise of 
judgment grounded in policy concerns.”  Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quotation marks 
omitted).  The length of time an agency has considered the 
question also relates to whether the agency has been 
consistent in its interpretation over the years.  In general, 
more deference is afforded to longstanding agency 
interpretations, although this single factor is not itself 
outcome-determinative.  See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) (“We 
normally accord particular deference to an agency 
interpretation of longstanding duration . . . .”); Cleary, 167 
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1. 
 
A somewhat detailed description of the nature of an 
Acquiescence Ruling is necessary to aid our deference 
analysis.  Broadly, agencies are empowered to interpret a 
statute through the processes of rulemaking, adjudication, or 
licensing.  Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 
551, et seq.  Rulemaking is defined as the “agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,” and a rule is 
defined as an “agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect.”  Id. § 551(4), (5).  The 
rulemaking process must involve the notice-and-comment 
procedures outlined in the APA unless there is good cause or 
the proposed rule falls into the category of “interpretative 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice.”  Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).  In 
the context of the administration of the Social Security Act, 
the SSA issues two types of rulings which do not involve 
notice-and-comment procedures:  Social Security Rulings, 
which address both administrative and judicial decisions, and 
Acquiescence Rulings,16 which relate only to decisions by 
federal appellate courts.  
                                                                                                     
F.3d at 808 (providing that informal agency interpretations 
“will receive some deference by the court if they are . . . 
consistent with prior administrative views”).  But see Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (affording Chevron deference to an 
interpretation by the Federal Communications Commission 
despite the recent change in policy at the agency because 
“[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze 
the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework”); 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (“An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.  On the 
contrary, the agency . . . must consider varying interpretations 
and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”). 
Social Security and Acquiescence 
 
16 Although it is clear that the process for formulating an 
Acquiescence Ruling does not require notice-and-comment, 
the procedure employed by the SSA is somewhat opaque 
because the agency’s internal guidelines do not explain the 
process for drafting and approving an Acquiescence Ruling or 
who bears the responsibility for doing so. 
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Rulings, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ 
rulings-pref.html (last visited August 8, 2012). 
 
Acquiescence Rulings “explain how SSA will apply a 
holding by a United States Court of Appeals that is at 
variance with [the agency’s] national policies for adjudicating 
claims.”  Acquiescence Ruling Definition, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/regulations/def-ar.htm (last visited 
August 8, 2012); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.985(b) (stating that 
the SSA will issue an Acquiescence Ruling when it 
“determine[s] that a United States Court of Appeals holding 
conflicts with [the SSA’s] interpretation of a provision of the 
Social Security Act or regulations”); Social Security 
Acquiescence Ruling 05–1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 
2005) (“An acquiescence ruling explains how [the SSA] will 
apply a holding in a decision of a United States Court of 
Appeals that [the SSA] determine[s] conflicts with [its] 
interpretation of a provision of the Social Security Act (Act) 
or regulations when the Government has decided not to seek 
further review of that decision or is unsuccessful on further 
review.”).  The content of this type of ruling “describe[s] the 
administrative case and the court decision, identif[ies] the 
issue(s) involved, and explain[s] how [the SSA] will apply 
the holding, including, as necessary, how the holding relates 
to other decisions within the applicable circuit.”  20 C.F.R. § 
404.985(b).   Acquiescence Rulings are announced through 
publication “in the ‘Notices’ section of the Federal Register 
under the authority of the Commissioner of Social Security 
and are effective upon publication.”  Acquiescence Ruling 
Definition, supra.  Importantly, “ARs do not have the force 
and effect of the law or regulations,” although the SSA 
requires that they be “binding on all components of SSA 
unless superceded, rescinded, or modified by another ruling.”  
Id.17
                                              
17 It might appear from this brief description that the name 
“Acquiescence Ruling” is something of a misnomer given 
that these rulings are issued to indicate the SSA’s policy of 
refusing to follow the decision of a Court of Appeals.  
However, such rulings specifically explain the SSA’s general 
policy that it will comply with the appellate ruling within the 
circuit where the ruling was issued except to the extent that it 
elects to relitigate the issue.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.985(a) 
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2. 
 
 We now turn to AR 92-2(6) which, as noted, contains 
the SSA’s interpretation of § 423(f).  Without elucidating the 
SSA’s reasoning, the Acquiescence Ruling provides that “the 
term ‘current,’ as used in the statutory and regulatory 
language concerning termination of disability benefits, [] 
relate[s] to the time of the cessation under consideration in 
the initial determination of cessation.”  AR 92-2(6).  During 
the course of a cessation proceeding, the ruling explains, the 
relevant factor is “the claimant’s condition . . . at the time of 
the cessation determination, not the claimant’s condition at 
the time of the disability hearing / reconsideration 
determination, ALJ decision or Appeals Council decision.”  
Id.  The ruling also discloses the SSA’s policy that any 
condition that became disabling during the pendency of a 
proceeding would result in the solicitation of a new 
application for benefits.  AR 92-2(6) concludes by explaining 
that, in light of its disagreement with Difford
Several factors counsel against according 
, it would 
comply with that decision in the Sixth Circuit only. 
Chevron 
deference to AR 92-2(6).  For instance, Acquiescence Rulings 
do not undergo notice-and-comment before their passage.  
We also note that Acquiescence Rulings lack the force of law, 
a view supported by the SSA’s language in its internal 
policies, see Social Security and Acquiescence Rulings, supra 
(“Acquiescence Rulings do not have the force and effect of 
the law or regulations.”), and our prior jurisprudence.18  See
                                                                                                     
(“We will apply a holding in a United States Court of Appeals 
decision that we determine conflicts with our interpretation of 
a provision of the Social Security Act or regulations . . . . 
within the applicable circuit . . . .”).  Such compliance is 
generally proper to avoid exceeding the scope of the agency’s 
power, because it is axiomatic that it is within the province of 
the judiciary “to say what the law is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).   
 
 
18 It is worth explaining what we mean when we refer 
to “the force of law.”  The Supreme Court has 
explained that a rule has “the ‘force and effect of law’” 
when it possesses “certain substantive characteristics” 
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Mercy, 380 F.3d at 155 (noting that “agency interpretive 
guidelines do not rise to the level of a regulation and do not 
have the effect of law” (quotation marks omitted)).  Further, it 
is unclear how much care the SSA exerted in crafting AR 92-
2(6).  The ruling spans a total of three-and-a-half pages, two 
of which are dedicated to describing the circumstances of the 
case that prompted its issuance.  The SSA devotes only one 
paragraph to its interpretation of the statute and does not 
explain how or why it reached its interpretation, a factor 
which weighs against deference.  See Packard v. Pittsburgh 
Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 252–53 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding a 
single-paragraph “informal and cursory” letter by the 
Department of Transportation interpreting the Motor Carrier 
Act was not entitled to Chevron
 
 deference).         
There are, however, several institutional concerns 
which counsel towards Chevron deference.  The Social 
Security Act imbues the SSA with “exceptionally broad 
authority to prescribe standards” for effectuating the purpose 
of the statute.  Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 
(1981); see
                                                                                                     
and is “the product of certain procedural requisites.” 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 (1979).  
An “important touchstone” for distinguishing whether 
a rule has the force of law is whether the rule “affect[s] 
individual rights and obligations.”  Id. at 302 
(quotation marks omitted).  While Acquiescence 
Rulings are “binding” within the SSA, this binding 
effect does not extend beyond the agency to bear on 
the “individual rights and obligations” of the people 
and entities regulated by the SSA.  Thus, as the SSA 
recognizes, Acquiescence Rulings lack the force of 
law.   
 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (directing the SSA to “adopt 
reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and 
provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence 
and the method of taking and furnishing the same” for 
disability cases).  In other words, the Social Security Act does 
not explicitly cover a vast number of details related to the 
day-to-day administration of the Social Security program, and 
Congress has relied on the SSA to fill this abyss.  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has observed that “the Social Security 
hearing system is probably the largest adjudicative agency in 
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the western world.”  Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 28–29 
(2003) (quotation marks omitted).  Given the vast scope and 
complexity of the program, “[t]he need for efficiency is self-
evident.”  Id. at 29.  We are thus faced with a situation where 
the agency has a great deal of expertise in administering a 
complex program and has been entrusted with a great deal of 
power by Congress.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms., 545 
U.S. at 980–81 (deferring to a Federal Communications 
Commission regulation under Chevron because Congress 
gave “the Commission the authority to promulgate binding 
legal rules; the Commission issued the order under review in 
the exercise of that authority; and no one questions that the 
order is within the Commission’s jurisdiction”); cf. Gonzales, 
546 U.S. at 268–69 (declining to give Chevron
 
 deference to 
the Attorney General’s interpretation of the Controlled 
Substances Act because the Attorney General lacked the 
expertise and authority to make such an interpretation).  The 
issue here — the timing for review of a disability benefits 
recipient who may no longer be disabled — is of great 
importance to the administration of the program, and variance 
in the internal rules for such a determination could create an 
administrative nightmare at all levels of review.  This is 
especially true in light of the length of time that appears to 
pass between the initial cessation date and the hearing before 
an ALJ, which in this case spanned four years.  It is also 
worth noting that the interpretation here is not a recent 
invention; it has been in effect for twenty years and appears to 
have been consistently applied by the SSA outside of the 
Sixth Circuit.  We have no doubt that despite the brevity of 
AR 92-2(6), it represents the considered judgment of the SSA 
in determining how to manage a highly detailed and complex 
statutory scheme. 
After consideration of the above factors, we are 
persuaded that Skidmore deference provides the proper lens 
through which to view AR 92-2(6).19
                                              
19 We need not decide whether, under the fact-intensive test 
we have described, any Acquiescence Ruling could merit 
Chevron deference. 
  Congress has imbued 
the SSA with the authority to enact regulations with legal 
effect, but the SSA elected not to do so and instead 
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formulated its policy through the informal mechanism of an 
Acquiescence Ruling, a type of ruling that is non-binding 
except within the agency.  It is not entirely clear from the 
Supreme Court’s precedent whether the lack of the “force of 
law” is always fatal to the application of Chevron, but in any 
event, the lack of legal effect of this ruling, combined with 
the absence of formal notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
the failure of the SSA to describe its reasoning, cannot be 
counterbalanced by the SSA’s institutional desire for 
uniformity and ease of administration. 20
 
 
* * * * * 
 
We therefore hold that Skidmore, not Chevron
 
, 
provides the type of deference applicable to our review of AR 
92-2(6). 
D. 
 
Having determined that we will employ Skidmore 
deference in reviewing AR 92-2(6), the central question we 
are tasked with answering is whether the SSA’s interpretation 
is persuasive.  We do not believe this question can be 
answered by conducting an independent review of the statute 
and then comparing our analysis with that of the agency, for 
such a process would not endow the agency’s interpretation 
with the “respect” that it may be entitled to under Skidmore.  
Instead, to decide whether we should defer to an agency’s 
interpretation after we have determined that Skidmore 
provides the appropriate lens through which to view that 
interpretation, we begin by considering how much
                                              
20  We note our decision to apply Skidmore deference to AR 
92-2(6) is contrary to the only other court of appeals decision 
addressing what type of deference should be given to this 
ruling.  See Johnson, 191 F.3d 770 (applying Chevron 
deference to AR 92-2(6) without discussion).  Because the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Johnson 
predates the Supreme Court’s decisions in Christensen, Mead, 
and Barnhart, we do not view its application of Chevron as 
persuasive. 
 deference 
the agency’s opinion is entitled to.   
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As noted, Skidmore deference requires a court to 
assign a “weight” to an administrative judgment based on 
“the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”  323 U.S. at 140.  Such 
weight is appropriate, the Skidmore Court held, because 
“rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator 
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by 
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience 
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”  Id.  We, like many of our sister 
courts of appeals, have adopted Mead’s conceptualization of 
the Skidmore framework as a “sliding-scale” test in which the 
level of weight afforded to an interpretation varies depending 
on our analysis of the enumerated factors.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 
228 (“The fair measure of deference to an agency 
administering its own statute has been understood to vary 
with circumstances[,] . . . produc[ing] a spectrum of judicial 
responses, from great respect at one end, to near indifference 
at the other.” (citations omitted)); see Ebbert v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 115 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(referring to certain categories of documents as being “at the 
lower end of the Skidmore scale of deference”); see also 
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1271 
(2007) (determining, after a five-year review of all courts of 
appeals cases applying Skidmore, that “the sliding-scale 
model of Skidmore
 
 deference dominates the independent 
judgment model among the federal circuit courts of appeals”). 
Through our previous applications of Skidmore to 
informal agency interpretations, some important factors have 
emerged.  For example, we have noted that more deference is 
granted under Skidmore’s sliding scale test when the 
agency’s interpretation is “issued contemporaneous[ly] with a 
statute.”  Madison, 233 F.3d at 187.  Less deference is 
afforded when an agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with 
its prior positions.  See Mercy, 380 F.3d at 155 (holding the 
Skidmore factors counseled against affording the agency’s 
interpretation deference given the agency’s “internally 
conflicting positions” and the unreasonableness of its 
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interpretation).  We have held that, when determining what 
deference to give to an agency’s actions under Skidmore, 
“[t]he most important considerations are whether the agency’s 
interpretation ‘is consistent and contemporaneous with other 
pronouncements of the agency and whether it is reasonable 
given the language and purpose of the Act.’”  DDNR, 685 
F.3d at 284 (quoting Cleary
 
, 167 F.3d at 808).  
Additionally, many of the same circumstances we 
found relevant for determining whether to apply Chevron 
deference are also useful for deciding the level of deference 
due under Skidmore.  For example, the relative expertise of 
the SSA in administering a complex statutory scheme and the 
agency’s longstanding, unchanging policy regarding this issue 
counsel towards a higher level of deference.  See Alaska 
Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 492 (holding that 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in internal 
guidance memoranda merited sufficient “respect” under 
Skidmore for the Court to defer to the agency’s 
“longstanding, consistently maintained interpretation” 
because the EPA was the “expert federal agency charged with 
enforcing the [CAA]”).  On the other hand, the brevity of AR 
92-2(6) and its underdeveloped reasoning counsel toward a 
lower level of deference.  See Packard, 418 F.3d at 252–53 
(holding that a brief letter by the Department of 
Transportation interpreting the Motor Carrier Act was entitled 
to no deference under Skidmore
 
 because the letter “simply 
provide[d] no reasoning or analysis that a court could 
properly find persuasive”).         
Applying these factors to the instant matter reveals that 
a relatively high level of deference is warranted.  As we have 
explained above, the SSA is an agency to which Congress has 
given “exceptionally broad authority” to manage a complex, 
nationwide administrative system.  Schweiker, 453 U.S. at 43.  
The need for uniformity in such an organization cannot be 
doubted.  Moreover, administering the Social Security Act is 
the central purpose of the SSA, and the SSA has developed a 
massive body of expertise during the 56 years of the disability 
insurance program’s existence.  Although the text of the 
Acquiescence Ruling does not explain the reasoning behind 
the SSA’s adoption of its interpretation, the SSA appears to 
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have consistently applied this policy during the past 20 years 
and its reasons for creating a policy which sets a fixed date 
for review of a cessation determination are not difficult to 
discern.  In sum, these considerations counsel toward 
applying a fairly high level of deference on the Skidmore
 
 
scale. 
 After applying an appropriately high level of deference 
under Skidmore, we find the SSA’s interpretation of § 423(f) 
sufficiently persuasive to defer to it.  While it may not be the 
interpretation we would adopt if we were to engage in an 
independent review, the interpretation contained in AR 92-
2(6) represents the considered judgment of the agency and is 
in accordance with the SSA’s statutory mandate to set rules 
for the governance of the disability insurance program.  
Essentially, the SSA conceptualizes the cessation scheme as 
one in which there is a single determination followed by 
several layers of review.  Under this view, the terms “now” 
and “current” in § 423(f) refer to the date of the initial finding 
that a recipient’s disability has ceased.  Therefore, the ALJ’s 
role in a cessation proceeding is to review the SSA’s 
determination that a benefits recipient was not eligible for 
benefits as of a fixed, specific date, not to determine whether 
he might have become eligible at some later time.  The SSA’s 
interpretation finds support in the fact that the Social Security 
Act requires that a “period of disability” be “continuous” and 
requires the filing of an application for benefits in order to 
begin such a period.  42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2).  The Social 
Security program is thus designed to prevent any breaks in 
the continuity of a period of disability and the attendant 
benefits that flow from such a disability.  As the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized, allowing an ALJ 
to consider a benefits recipient’s status several years after the 
initial determination that the recipient was no longer disabled 
would potentially allow a break in continuity in contravention 
of the statute.  See Johnson, 191 F.3d at 747 (deferring to the 
SSA’s interpretation in AR 92-2(6) because of the potential 
lack of continuity in the disability period and the fact that 
allowing a revised evaluation of the recipient at the time of 
the ALJ hearing would require the ALJ “to adjudicate 
disability for a new period of time — from the cessation of 
disability benefits . . . until the date of the ALJ’s decision”).  
Moreover, the Social Security Act was designed to ensure 
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that benefits would accrue only during periods of time in 
which a person is truly unable to work.  If Hagans was 
capable of working as of September 1, 2004, but became 
classifiable as disabled on some later date, allowing him to 
receive disability benefits for that interim period when he was 
not disabled would thwart the purpose of the SSA. 
 
In response to these arguments, Hagans contends that 
our opinion in Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 
2003), requires that we consider an individual’s status at the 
time of the ALJ hearing.  That case, however, requires only 
that an ALJ consider evidence produced after the cessation 
date, not the status of the disability benefits recipient as of 
some length of time — usually years — after the SSA 
determined that person was no longer disabled.  Id. at 381.  
Indeed, the Social Security Act unambiguously compels 
consideration of later-acquired evidence by the ALJ.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 423(f) (“Any determination under this section shall 
be made on the basis of all the evidence available in the 
individual’s case file, including new evidence concerning the 
individual’s prior or current condition which is presented by 
the individual or secured by the Commissioner of Social 
Security.”).  While the fact that all evidence available must be 
considered may support Hagans’s construction of § 423(f), it 
is not dispositive because evidence acquired after the 
cessation date can nonetheless be relevant for the purposes of 
determining the individual’s capabilities on the cessation 
date.21
 
 
If the evidence is sufficient to show that Hagans was 
not disabled as of September 1, 2004, he would not be 
entitled to benefits as of that date.  Otherwise, a fully 
recovered disability benefits recipient who later relapsed 
could receive benefits for several years during which he was 
not actually disabled and was capable of work.  Moreover, the 
ALJ’s role in a Social Security cessation proceeding is to 
review the SSA’s determination that a benefits recipient was 
                                              
21 We also note that the ALJ in this case did consider all 
relevant evidence introduced at the time of the hearing, as 
required, including medical reports dating from 2005 and 
2006. 
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not eligible for benefits as of a certain date, not to determine 
whether he might have become eligible at some later time.  
Indeed, after the ALJ denied Hagans’s appeal, he filed a new 
application for disability benefits covering a more recent time 
period on the grounds that his impairments have worsened 
since the SSA  determined that his disability ended.   
 
Given our deference to the SSA’s persuasive 
interpretation of § 423(f) under Skidmore
 
, we will affirm the 
District Court’s finding that the SSA correctly evaluated 
Hagans’s condition as of the date on which the agency first 
found that Hagans’s eligibility for disability benefits ceased. 
IV. 
 
Hagans cursorily argues that the ALJ’s adverse 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.  Because 
this argument is plainly meritless, we need address it only 
briefly. 
 
When the SSA finds that a disability benefits recipient 
no longer has the physical or mental impairment to render 
him disabled, the SSA may determine that the recipient is no 
longer entitled to disability benefits.  42 U.S.C. § 423(f).  
Substantial evidence must demonstrate that the recipient’s 
condition has experienced “medical improvement” such that 
the recipient is “able to engage in substantial gainful 
activity.”  Id.
 
  A key part of this analysis involves comparing 
the severity of the impairment at the time of the most 
favorable recent disability determination with the current 
severity of that impairment.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(7), 
(c)(1).  The Social Security regulations require that benefit 
recipients be subject to the following set of eight evaluation 
questions when the SSA is attempting to determine whether 
they remain disabled: 
(1) Are you engaging in substantial gainful 
activity? If you are (and any applicable trial 
work period has been completed), we will find 
disability to have ended (see paragraph (d)(5) of 
this section). 
 
(2) If you are not, do you have an impairment or 
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combination of impairments which meets or 
equals the severity of an impairment listed in 
appendix 1 of this subpart? If you do, your 
disability will be found to continue. 
 
(3) If you do not, has there been medical 
improvement as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of 
this section? If there has been medical 
improvement as shown by a decrease in medical 
severity, see step (4). If there has been no 
decrease in medical severity, there has been no 
medical improvement. (See step (5).) 
 
(4) If there has been medical improvement, we 
must determine whether it is related to your 
ability to do work in accordance with 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) of this section; 
i.e., whether or not there has been an increase in 
the residual functional capacity based on the 
impairment(s) that was present at the time of the 
most recent favorable medical determination. If 
medical improvement is not related to your 
ability to do work, see step (5). If medical 
improvement is related to your ability to do 
work, see step (6). 
 
(5) If we found at step (3) that there has been no 
medical improvement or if we found at step (4) 
that the medical improvement is not related to 
your ability to work, we consider whether any 
of the exceptions in paragraphs (d) and (e) of 
this section apply. If none of them apply, your 
disability will be found to continue. If one of 
the first group of exceptions to medical 
improvement applies, see step (6). If an 
exception from the second group of exceptions 
to medical improvement applies, your disability 
will be found to have ended. The second group 
of exceptions to medical improvement may be 
considered at any point in this process. 
 
(6) If medical improvement is shown to be 
related to your ability to do work or if one of 
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the first group of exceptions to medical 
improvement applies, we will determine 
whether all your current impairments in 
combination are severe (see § 404.1521). This 
determination will consider all your current 
impairments and the impact of the combination 
of those impairments on your ability to 
function. If the residual functional capacity 
assessment in step (4) above shows significant 
limitation of your ability to do basic work 
activities, see step (7). When the evidence 
shows that all your current impairments in 
combination do not significantly limit your 
physical or mental abilities to do basic work 
activities, these impairments will not be 
considered severe in nature. If so, you will no 
longer be considered to be disabled. 
 
(7) If your impairment(s) is severe, we will 
assess your current ability to do substantial 
gainful activity in accordance with § 404.1560. 
That is, we will assess your residual functional 
capacity based on all your current impairments 
and consider whether you can still do work you 
have done in the past. If you can do such work, 
disability will be found to have ended. 
(8) If you are not able to do work you have 
done in the past, we will consider one final step.  
Given the residual functional capacity 
assessment and considering your age, education 
and past work experience, can you do other 
work? If you can, disability will be found to 
have ended.  If you cannot, disability will be 
found to continue. 
 
Id. § 404.1594(f).  Within the context of a termination 
proceeding, there is a burden-shifting scheme in which 
a recipient must first “introduce[] evidence that his or 
her condition remains essentially the same as it was at 
the time of the earlier determination.”  Early v. 
Heckler, 743 F.2d 1002, 1007 (3d Cir. 1984).  Once a 
recipient has done so, “the burden shifts to the [SSA] 
to ‘present evidence that there has been sufficient 
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improvement in the [recipient’s] condition to allow the 
[recipient] to undertake gainful activity.’”  Id. (quoting 
Kuzmin v. Schweiker
 
, 714 F.2d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 
1983)). 
 Hagans points to no evidence that contradicts the 
ALJ’s determination that his medical impairments underwent 
an improvement between January 2003 and September 2004, 
and thus fails to shift the burden to the SSA.  The medical 
reports and the RFC indicated that, although Hagans was no 
longer capable of doing his past relevant work, his increased 
mobility and the decrease in the severity of his conditions 
rendered him fit to engage in sedentary work.  Moreover, 
although Hagans seems to argue that the ALJ did not properly 
consider his mental illness (depression) in conjunction with 
his other problems, the ALJ did consider Hagans’s mental 
problems and determined they did not meet the criteria to 
constitute a listed impairment.  She also considered his 
depression in determining the type of work Hagans could 
perform.   
 
 As the record amply supports the ALJ’s finding that 
Hagans ceased to be disabled on September 1, 2004, we will 
affirm the District Court’s finding that this determination was 
supported by substantial evidence. 
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
 
